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The Perilous Intersection of Rojas v. Los Angeles Superior
Court and the Calderon Act-California Civil Code Section
1375
Marlynn P. Howe*
The Confidentiality of Expert Reports and Other Written Materials
Produced During Mediation of Homeowner Association Construction

Defect Claims Is in Jeopardy

I. INTRODUCTION
Participants in mandatory mediations of homeowner association ("HOA")'
construction defect claims may be in for an ugly surprise if their participation is
based upon the misapprehension that information exchanged during mediation,
including materials prepared by their non-testifying expert consultants,2 are
protected from later disclosure to third parties by a mediation privilege. A recent
California Second District Court of Appeal decision, Rojas v. Los Angeles

Superior Court,3 attempts to carve dangerous new exceptions to the broad
confidentiality protections given to mediation communications under California
Evidence Code sections 703.5 and 1119-1124. 4 Given its potentially harmful

implications for the confidential mediation process in California, particularly
with respect to mandatory mediations of HOA construction defect claims, it is
unsurprising that on January 15, 2003, the California Supreme Court granted
petitions for review of this decision.'
If Rojas is upheld, writings prepared by experts for mediation would be
exposed to disclosure to third parties after the mediation concludes. Arguably,
these third parties include parties who were obligated to participate in the
mandatory mediation proceeding but did not (such as recalcitrant insurance
* J.D., University of Pepperdine, School of Law, 1985. Marlynn P. Howe is currently an attorney with
the law firm of Burkhalter, Michaels, Kessler & George, LLP, in Irvine, California.
1. The term "homeowner association" is used herein as synonymous with the term "association" as
defined in California Civil Code section 1351 (a) to mean "a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association
created for the purpose of managing a common interest development." The term "common interest
development" is defined in Civil Code section 1351(c) as "any of the following: (1) A community apartment
project. (2) A condominium project. (3) A planned development. (4) A stock cooperative."
2. The terms "non-testifying expert/consultant" and "expert" are used interchangeably herein to refer to
professional consultants who have been engaged by a party's attorney to provide analysis, testing and expert
opinions regarding construction defect claims, but have not yet been designated to testify at trial pursuant to
California Evidence Code section 721.
3. 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 (Ct. App. 2002), review granted,63 P.3d 212 (Cal. 2003).
4. CAL. EV1D. CODE §§ 703.5, t 119-1124 (West 2003). All statutory citations herein are to California
statutory codes.
5. Rojas, 63 P.3d at 212.
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companies), and parties who later can convince a sympathetic court on a case-bycase basis that their "need" for the expert materials outweighs the abstract
importance to the mediation privilege of enforcing statutory safeguards that were
designed to provide near blanket confidentiality for mediation communications.
As a result of this type of potential exploitation and exposure, the willingness of
attorneys and their clients to be forthcoming in disclosure during mediation likely
will be reduced substantially. This chilling effect threatens the viability of
mediation as a meaningful dispute resolution alternative to litigation because
effective mediation depends in large part upon candid and open communication
among participants. The impact of Rojas, however, will be particularly acute with
respect to mediations involving HOA construction defect claims because, by
nature, the success of these mediations depends upon the free exchange of an
immense amount of expert reports, test data and opinions. Consequently, before
participating in mandatory mediation proceedings pursuant to Civil Code section
13756 (known as the "Calderon Act"), 7 HOA Board members, attorneys, experts,
developers and builders should thoroughly acquaint themselves with the potential
ramifications of the Rojas decision pending the California Supreme Court's
review, and plan their mediation communications and presentations accordingly.
II. ANALYSIS
A.

The CalderonAct

The newly revised Calderon Act became effective July 1, 2002. 8 The Act
provides that, before an HOA may file a complaint for construction-related
defects against a builder, developer or general contractor, the HOA must notify
the party or parties it intends to sue of the HOA's claim. 9 The parties must
participate in a 180-day dispute resolution process that is designed to provide a
forum for the early exchange of expert reports and other information among the
builder, developer, design professionals, subcontractors, insurance companies
and HOA, for the purposes of narrowing issues and eliminating costly discovery,
thereby facilitating early resolution of construction defect claims.'°
The Calderon Act sets forth a detailed procedure for the parties to prepare for
a mandatory non-binding mediation to be presided over by a "dispute resolution
facilitator."" Among other things, the HOA is obligated to provide an initial

6.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375 (West 2002).
7. Id. §§ 1375, 1375.05, 1375.1 (West 2003). The term "Calderon Act" is used herein to refer to Civil
Code sections 1375, 1375.05, and 1375.1. This article focuses narrowly on those provisions relating to the
parties' obligations to prepare for, and participate in, Calderon mandatory mediation proceedings, including the
preparation of expert materials.
8. Id.
9. Id. § 1375.
10. Id.
11. Id.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
defect list to the builder, developer or general contractor who has been put on
notice of the claim (the "Respondent"). 2 The Respondent, in turn, may ask for a
meeting with the Board of Directors for the HOA to discuss the claim. 3 The
Calderon Act provides that "the discussions at [this] meeting are privileged
communications and are not admissible in evidence in any civil action"
4 (such as
a lawsuit or arbitration), unless the parties consent to their admission.
Within sixty days, the Respondent and the HOA must provide each other
with access to their own files for information that might lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. 5 For instance, the Respondent must provide plans,
specifications, and subcontract files to the HOA. 6 The HOA must provide access
to maintenance records, survey questionnaires, and testing results." To the extent
that any party claims that its files are privileged, that party must prepare and
deliver a privilege log identifying the documents withheld. 8
Also within sixty days, the Respondent must notify "all subcontractors,
design professionals, their insurers," and any other potentially responsible parties
and their insurers of the HOA claim, and the opportunity to participate in testing,
inspections and the selection of the dispute resolution facilitator (usually a
professional mediator or Special Master). 1" This notice must also contain
warnings that the right to challenge the selection of the dispute resolution
facilitator and the right to conduct testing and inspections may be waived if the
recipient of the notice does not participate in the process as scheduled during the
180-day period. 2° Upon receipt of this notice, the subcontractor or design
professional is obligated to acknowledge receipt of the notice, provide the HOA
and Respondent with specified information regarding its insurance coverage, and
place its insurance carrier(s) on notice of the claim. 21
Within 100 days, a "case management meeting" is held, and a case
management statement is prepared with the assistance of the dispute resolution
facilitator. 22 This statement outlines the procedure and timing for (1) the
"[e]stablishment of a document depository," (2) the "[p]rovision of a more detailed
list of defects" by the HOA, (3) nonintrusive inspections, (4) invasive testing, and
(5) preparation of a comprehensive settlement demand by the HOA so that the
parties can meaningfully participate in mediation.23
12. id. § 1375(b)(l)-(5).
13. Id. § 1375(d); see also § 1363.05(b) (stating that the Board is authorized to meet in executive session
for this meeting).
14. id. § 1375(d).
15. Id. § 1375(e)(1).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1375(e)(2).
20. See id. (providing the required content of the notification).
21. Id. § 1375(e)(2)(A)-(B).
22. Id. § 1375(f)-(h).
23. ld. § 1375(h)(1)-(6).
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The case management statement must also provide a date and time for a
mediation to occur among all the parties. 24 Upon agreement of all parties, the
statement may also provide for "the exchange of consultant or expert photographs;
expert presentations; expert meetings; or any other mechanism" the parties deem
appropriate to resolve the dispute. 2' The mediation and all other exchanges of
information, presentations and expert meetings must take place within 180 days,
unless an extension of time is obtained by agreement of the parties2 6
Subject to a limited list of exceptions, various penalties are associated with a
party's failure to attend and participate in the mediation, including restrictions on
the party's right to later conduct its own testing and inspections, and its ability to
object to any settlement reached. 27 While penalties may apply for a failure to
participate, the Calderon Act contains no provision for a non-participating party
to obtain expert witness materials paid for by another party who exchanged such
materials at the previous mediation. Indeed, Civil Code section 1375(l)
specifically provides that "all defect lists and demands, communications,
negotiations, and settlement offers made in the course of the prelitigation dispute
resolution process provided by this section shall be inadmissible pursuant to
Sections 1119 to 1124, inclusive, of the Evidence Code and all applicable
decisional law."
Thus, according to section 1375(l), the confidentiality of Calderon mediation
communications depends upon the protections afforded by Evidence Code sections
1119-1124 and applicable published court decisions interpreting those provisions.2 9
As discussed more fully below, until recently, these statutes provided for almost
blanket confidentiality protection of mediation communications. Within the past
several years, however, this privilege has been steadily eroded by court decisions
that impose new, nonstatutory exceptions to the mediation privilege.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. § 1375(h)(8).
Id. § 1375(i).
Id. § 1375(c).
Id. § 1375(e). Penalties will not apply when:
(1)[Ain insurer for a subcontractor or design professional ... did not [receive notice of the
claim] at least 30 days prior to the commencement of inspections or testing ....(2) [Tlhe
insurer's insured did not participate in [the testing] ....(3) [Tjhe insurer has, after receiving
notice of a complaint ... retained separate counsel, who did not participate in the ... dispute
resolution process, to defend its insured as to the allegations in the complaint. (4) [I]t is
reasonably likely that the insured would suffer prejudice if additional inspections or testing are
not permitted. [And] (5) [t]he information obtainable through the proposed additional
inspections or testing is not available through any reasonable alternative sources. ...
Id. § 1375.05(c).
28. Id. § 1375(l).
29. Id.
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B. Confidentiality and the Mediation Privilege
If polled, most attorneys would probably acknowledge that they participate in
mediations with the understanding that their mediation communications,
including oral discussions and the exchange of expert written materials prepared
specifically for mediation, are protected from later disclosure by a "mediation
privilege." In addition to this "privilege," it is not uncommon for parties and their
counsel to sign a stipulation prior to the commencement of mediation affirming the
confidentiality of the anticipated mediation communications. These stipulations
serve to enhance the perception on the part of mediation participants that the
mediation is a confidential proceeding.
In California, confidentiality protection for mediation communications is
provided by a statutory scheme that includes Evidence Code sections 703.5, 1119
(and its predecessor section 1152), and 1121. While the confidentiality
protections provided by these statutes do not technically constitute a "privilege,"
the concept of a mediation privilege springs from these statutes. As such, the
term "mediation privilege" is used loosely by courts, legal professionals and in
this article to refer to the statutory confidentiality protections established by the
Evidence Code.
This statutory scheme recognizes that a cornerstone of effective mediation is
confidentiality. During mediations that occur in the litigation context, parties are
often encouraged to discuss candidly the weaknesses and strengths of their legal
positions and the evidence supporting their claims or defenses. Such discussions
facilitate early resolution of lawsuits because parties are better able to assess,
understand and evaluate their own positions and those of their adversaries.
Maximization of open communication during mediation is difficult to achieve,
however, unless litigants have assurance that the information they reveal will not
be disclosed to their adversaries or other third parties without their permission,
and that the information will not be exploited or otherwise used to their
disadvantage during subsequent judicial proceedings in the same or another
lawsuit. This assurance can be provided in several ways, including rules of
evidence, statutes, court-created privileges, contracts (or stipulations), and courtissued protective orders. The key to effective use of any method is that it must be
reliable in achieving confidentiality. In California, the most consistently utilized
manner of achieving confidentiality in mediation is either by contract (stipulation
of the parties) or by enforcement of the statutes contained in the Evidence Code.
C. The CaliforniaEvidence Code
Evidence Code section 703.5 provides, in part, that a mediator is not competent
to testify in any subsequent civil proceeding as to any statement, conduct, decision,
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or ruling that occurred during mediation. 3° Further confidentiality protection is
afforded by Evidence Code section 1119, which states in pertinent part:
(b) No writing, as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for the
purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation
consultation, is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the
writing shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative
adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which,
pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.
(c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and
between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation
consultation shall remain confidential.3
Evidence Code section 250 defines the term "writings" broadly to mean any
"means of recording upon any tangible thing, any form of communication or
representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or
combinations thereof." California courts have construed this definition broadly
to include photographs, videos, and tape recordings.33 Expert prepared materials,
photographs, videos, and raw test data fall neatly within the definition of the term
"writings" and the provisions of section 1119.-4 Finally, Evidence Code section
1121 prohibits any person, including a mediator, from submitting to a court a
mediator's report, evaluation, assessment, recommendation or finding of any
kind "concerning a mediation conducted by the mediator" unless the parties to
the mediation agree otherwise.35
While these statutes provide unambiguous confidentiality protection, there
are several statutory exceptions to the scope of protection afforded. For example,
Evidence Code section 1120 provides that evidence otherwise admissible or
discoverable is not protected by the mediation privilege purely because it has

30.

California Evidence Code section 703.5 reads:
No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and no arbitrator or mediator,
shall be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct,
decision, or ruling, occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceeding, except as to a
statement or conduct that could (a) give rise to civil or criminal contempt, (b) constitute a
crime, (c) be the subject of investigation by the State Bar or Commission on Judicial
Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings under paragraph (1)or (6) of
subdivision (a)of section 170.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, this section does not
apply to a mediator with regard to any mediation under Chapter II (commencing with Section
3160) of Part 2 of Division 8 of the Family Code.
Id. § 703.5 (West 2003).
31. Id. § 1119.
32. Id. § 250.
33. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 531-32 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing
admissibility of photographs and videos).
34. See CAL. EVlD. CODE §§ 250, 1119 (West 2003).
35. Id. § 1121.
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been introduced or used during mediation." In the context of a Calderon
mediation proceeding, section 1120 covers, for example, items such as the plans,
specifications and subcontract files of a general contractor that existed prior to
and independent of the Calderon mediation proceeding, and which the general
contractor is obligated to turn over to the HOA pursuant to Civil Code section
1375(e)(1).37 The mere introduction of these materials into a mediation
proceeding does not convert these otherwise admissible and discoverable
documents into privileged materials according to section 1120.38
Another statutory exception exists in Evidence Code section 1123, which
provides in part that a written settlement agreement prepared during mediation is
subject to admission if the agreement is signed by the parties to the settlement
and (1) "provides that it is admissible or subject to disclosure," (2) "provides that
it is enforceable or binding or words to that effect," (3) "all parties ... agree in
writing, or orally in accordance with [Evidence Code] Section 1118, to its
disclosure," or (4) "[t]he agreement is used to show fraud, duress,"39 or illegality
that is relevant to an issue in dispute. These and other statutory exceptions to the
mediation privilege set forth in the Evidence Code establish clear guidelines for
limiting abuse and misuse of the mediation process and mediation privilege.
According to the California Supreme Court, absent an express statutory
exception, Evidence Code "sections 703.5, 1119, and 1121, unqualifiedly bar[]
disclosure of communications made during mediation ...
D. The Mediation Privilege Under Attack
Despite the breadth of this explicit statutory confidentiality protection, recent
federal and state court decisions have carved new, nonstatutory exceptions to the
mediation privilege. In Rinaker v. Superior Court,41 the Third District California
Court of Appeal held that the mediation confidentiality provisions of Evidence
Code section 1119 must yield to a juvenile's due process right to use prior

36. In its entirety, section 1120 reads:
(a) Evidence otherwise admissible or subject to discovery outside of a mediation or a mediation
consultation shall not be or become inadmissible or protected from disclosure solely by
reason of its introduction or use in a mediation or a mediation consultation.
(b) This chapter does not limit any of the following:
(1) The admissibility of an agreement to mediate a dispute.
(2) The effect of an agreement not to take a default or an agreement to extend the time
within which to act or refrain from acting in a pending civil action.
(3) Disclosure of the mere fact that a mediator has served, is serving, will serve, or was
contacted about serving as a mediator in a dispute.
Id. § 1120.
37. See id. §§ 1120, 1375(e)(1).
38. See id. § 1120.
39. Id. § 1123.
40. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 2001).
41. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Ct. App. 1998).
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inconsistent statements of a witness made during mediation for purposes of
allowing the juvenile to effectively confront and impeach the witness in a later
juvenile delinquency proceeding.42
In Rinaker, a victim purported to witness several juveniles throw rocks at his
automobile and he accused those juveniles of doing so. 4 ' The victim and the
juveniles agreed to a confidential mediation during which the victim/witness
allegedly admitted that he did not really see who had thrown the rocks at his
vehicle. 44 Later, during the juvenile delinquency proceedings, the juveniles sought
permission to compel the mediator to testify as to the prior inconsistent statements
of the victim/witness. 4 The mediator objected to testifying, citing, among other
things, the provisions of section 1119 prohibiting such testimony, and also
suggesting that the juveniles had waived their right to compel such testimony when
they voluntarily agreed to participate in a confidential mediation. 6 The juvenile
court judge found that the juvenile delinquency proceeding was not a civil action
and therefore section 1119, which by its own terms applies only to civil actions, did
not apply. 47 Accordingly, the juvenile court granted the juveniles' motion to compel
the mediator's testimony.4
On appeal, the court held that the juvenile delinquency proceeding was a
civil proceeding, not a criminal proceeding and, therefore, the confidentiality
provisions of section 1119 did apply, but that there are circumstances where
these provisions must yield to a juvenile's due process right to confront and
effectively cross-examine witnesses. 49 The court, however, made it clear that any
decision to "breach the confidential mediation process" should be given careful
consideration. ° In this regard, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate
directing the juvenile court to vacate its order compelling the mediator to testify
under oath and instructing the juvenile court judge to instead first hold an in
camera hearing with the mediator to determine whether a breach of the mediation
privilege was compelled in order for the juveniles to effectively exercise their
due process rights."t According to the court, the in camera hearing should involve

42. Id. at 466.
43. Id. at 467.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 468.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 468-69. As to the mediator's contention that the juveniles had waived their right to compel his
testimony by reason of their agreement to participate in a voluntary mediation, the court found that there was no
knowing waiver on the part of the juveniles (i.e., the juveniles did not know at the time they signed the
agreement that the witness would make statements during the mediation that would tend to exonerate them and
that they would need to compel the mediator to testify as to those statements in order to prevent perjury and
effectively cross-examine the victim witness). Id. at 471-72.
50. See id. at 472-73 (discussing the consideration of "factors bearing upon whether the minors'
constitutional right of effective impeachment compels breach of the confidential mediation process.").
51. Id.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
a three-pronged determination: (1) whether the mediator is competent to testify
(i.e., did the mediator actually hear the statements), (2) the probative value of the
statements (i.e., are the statements trustworthy or, rather, made for purposes of
compromise), and (3) whether the evidence sought can be introduced without
invading the mediation privilege (i.e., are there other equally or more credible
52
witnesses to the statements). Thus, although the Rinaker court created a
nonstatutory exception to the strict provisions of section 1119, it authorized use
of the exception under limited circumstances and subject to the three-pronged
determination described above.
In Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co.," a federal magistrate judge held that a
mediator can be compelled to testify for purposes of assisting the court in
determining a party's disputed capacity to sign a settlement agreement reached
during mediation. 4 In Olam, the plaintiff had defaulted on a memorandum of
agreement to settle (MOA) signed by her and her counsel at the conclusion of an
extended voluntary mediation.5 Although the MOA contemplated that a final
settlement agreement would be drafted and signed by the parties following the
mediation, the MOA expressly stated that the MOA, which contained the
material terms of the settlement reached, was a binding, enforceable agreement. 6
The defendant sought enforcement of the MOA 7 The plaintiff asserted that the
MOA was not enforceable because, for various psychological and physical health
reasons, she was incapable "of giving legally viable consent" to the MOA 8
Significantly, both the plaintiff and defendant waived relevant confidentiality
protections for purposes of allowing the court to determine the issue of
59
competency.
In order to determine the competency issue, the judge concluded that it was
necessary to consider the mediator's perception of the plaintiff's competency
during the mediation because the mediator was the most neutral eyewitness
participant60 The judge assumed, without asking, that the mediator would object
to being compelled to testify based upon the provisions of Evidence Code section
703.5, which provides that a mediator is not competent to testify on such
matters. 6' Despite the lack of waiver on the part of the mediator, the court found
that, on balance, there was justification to compel the mediator to testify despite
the plain language of section 703.5, because the probative value of the mediator's
testimony, coupled with the fact that there was no other equal or better neutral
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
68 F.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
1136-39.
1117.
1118.
1117.
1118-19.
1127.
1130; CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 2003).
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source for such information, outweighed the public policy interest in maintaining
the mediation privilege associated with such testimony." The judge specifically
noted, however, that if the plaintiff and defendant had not voluntarily waived
confidentiality, the analysis for this balancing test would have been much more
difficult.63 Indeed, it is not clear that the court would have reached the same
conclusion to compel the mediator to testify.
The Rinaker and Olam decisions triggered alarms in the mediation community
because they represented a new trend by the courts to create nonstatutory
exceptions to the mediation privilege. The California Supreme Court, however,
attempted to halt this trend in Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea California,
64
Inc., even though in dicta it approved of the Rinaker and Olam decisions.
In Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, the California Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether a mediator's report concerning the bad faith conduct of a
mediation participant was admissible for consideration by the trial court when it
ruled on a motion for sanctions. The appellate court had earlier reversed a
superior court order awarding sanctions against the defendants for alleged bad faith
mediation conduct, and remanded the matter back to the superior court so that the
superior court could enter an order reciting in detail the conduct or circumstances
justifying the order in accordance with Civil Procedure Code section 128.5.6
However, in its opinion reversing the sanction order, the appellate court
specifically rejected the defendants' contention that a mediator report of bad faith
conduct to the superior court was barred by the provisions of Evidence Code
section 1121 and that the superior court should not be entitled to consider the report
when ruling on the motion for sanctions. 6' The appellate court concluded that even
though Evidence Code sections 1119 and 1121 were unambiguous and provided
for almost blanket confidentiality of mediation communications, it would be absurd
to construe the two statutes to protect a party from its own bad faith conduct by
prohibiting a mediator from reporting such conduct to the trial court in connection
with a party's motion for sanctions. 68 Based upon the rule that judicial construction
of an otherwise unambiguous statute is permitted where application of the statute
according to its literal terms would lead to an "absurd" result or thwart the manifest
purpose of the Legislature, the appellate court determined that it was appropriate to
create a nonstatutory exception to the confidentiality requirements of sections 1119
and 1121 that would treat as admissible to the trial court a mediator's report of bad
faith conduct. 9

62. Oami, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1135-39.
63. Id. at 1133.
64. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
65. Id. at 1119.
66. Id. at 1122.
67. Id. at 1122-23.
68. Id. at 1119,1122.
69. Id. at 1122-23.
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The California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to reverse
the sanction award, but held that sections 1119 and 1121 were not subject to
judicial construction because the California Legislature had already considered
and decided that the policy of encouraging mediation by ensuring confidentiality
is promoted by avoiding the threat that frank expression of viewpoints by the
parties during mediation may subject a participant to sanctions.' ° The supreme
court also held that Evidence Code section 1119 is so clear and unambiguous that
a mediator may not provide any information to a court about the bad faith
conduct of a party, even when the conduct rises to the level of deserving to be
sanctioned by a court.] The legislative purpose behind section 1119, as affirmed
by the supreme court, is to encourage mediation by providing for confidentiality
of all communications: "[T]he purpose of confidentiality is to promote a 'candid
and informal exchange regarding events in the past ....

This frank exchange is

achieved only if the participants know that what is said in the mediation will not
be used to their
detriment through later court proceedings and other adjudicatory
72
processes."'
Thus, under the Foxgate decision and Civil Code section 1375(l) of the
Calderon Act, mediation communications, including expert reports, testing data
and photographs that are prepared specifically for a Calderon mandatory
mediation should be protected by the mediation privilege afforded by the
unambiguous language of Evidence Code section 1119. The Rojas decision,
however, has placed the confidentiality of those materials in jeopardy and may
thwart the legislative purpose of promoting the frank exchange of information at
mediation.
E. Rojas v. Los Angeles Superior Court
Until the California Supreme Court granted review, the Rojas decision
constituted a very dangerous legal precedent for HOA construction defect claims
that are subject to mandatory mediation proceedings under the Calderon Act
because the fact pattern of Rojas is strikingly similar to that of a typical HOA
construction defect claim.
1. Rojas' Underlying Litigation
The underlying litigation in Rojas involved a claim by the owners of an
apartment complex (collectively "Coffin") for construction defects.73 In 1996,
Coffin sued the builders of the apartment complex and various other subcontractors

70. Id. at 1128.
71. Id.at 1126, 1128.
72. Id.
at 1126 (citations omitted).
73. Rojas v. Los Angeles Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 100-01 (Ct. App. 2002), review granted,
63 P.3d 212 (Cal. 2003).
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and contractor entities (collectively "Builder Defendants"), alleging that numerous
construction defects had caused water intrusion in the apartment buildings,
resulting in the presence of toxic molds and other microbes throughout the
complex.7 4
The trial judge entered an order known as a "Case Management Order"
(CMO) that appointed a Special Master, stayed discovery, and required all parties
to attend and participate in a mediation.7 5 To facilitate mediation of the claim, the
CMO also required Coffin to apprise the Builder Defendants of all of the
construction defects they claimed existed on the property, with detailed
information concerning the type, extent and location of all such defects, as well
as to prepare and produce a repair report setting forth in detail the necessary
repairs and costs for such repairs.76
Following noninvasive and invasive testing, and other investigation of the
property, including air sampling for the presence of mold, by both Coffin and the
Builder Defendants, Coffin's legal team turned over to the Builder Defendants at
the mediation expert-prepared written materials, together with a preliminary
defect list, "an investigation binder containing hundreds of photographs of the
[a]partment [ciomplex," and other test reports and test data derived from their
investigation." The materials turned over by Coffin had been prepared and
produced by a team of consultants hired by Coffin's counsel.7" Significantly,
these materials were prepared for the purpose of exchanging information at the
mediation, as ordered by the court in the CMO.7 9
In late 1998, as the underlying litigation proceeded, one of the apartment
buildings was closed and its tenants were relocated, some to the other two
buildings of the apartment complex. 8° Coffin eventually settled the lawsuit
against the Builder Defendants in April 1999 and had repairs and abatement of
the apartment buildings completed.8'

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

80.

Id. at 101.

81.
stated:

100.

100 & n.l, 101.
103.
102-03.

Id. The settlement agreement provided for the confidentiality of the terms of the settlement and also
In addition, throughout this resolution of the matter, consultants provided defect reports, repair
reports, and photographs for informational purpose[s] which are protected by the Case
Management Order and Evidence Code §§ 1119 and 1152, and it is hereby agreed that such
materials and information contained therein shall not be published or disclosed in any way
without the prior consent of plaintiff or by court order.

Id.
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2. Rojas Trial Court Proceedings
In August 1999, subsequent to Coffin's settlement with the Builder
Defendants, a group of tenants (collectively the "Rojas Plaintiffs") sued Coffin and
the developers of the apartment complex (collectively the "Coffin Defendants"),
contending that the water intrusion at the apartment complex had permitted
microbes to infest the property, causing the Rojas Plaintiffs to suffer serious health
problems." They also contended that the Coffin Defendants had concealed the
construction defects and microbe infestation from them.83
The Rojas Plaintiffs served discovery requests on the Coffin Defendants,
demanding the production of, among other things, expert witness materials that
had been prepared for mediation during Coffin's earlier litigation against the
Builder Defendants. 4 When Coffin objected and refused to produce the materials
demanded based upon the mediation privilege of Evidence Code section 1119,
the Rojas Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production, arguing that: (1) most of
the documents demanded were purely "evidentiary" or "non-derivative"
materials and not protected by the attorney work product doctrine; (2) such
material included information regarding the location of physical evidence and
location and identity of witnesses; and (3) to the extent that any of the materials
demanded were "derivative" materials (i.e., containing attorney [or consultant]
interpretations or evaluations of fact or law), such items were subject to
disclosure upon a showing of good cause."
The Rojas Plaintiffs contended that good cause existed because they had no
other means by which to obtain the requested information since Coffin had
remediated the property and the alleged defective and unhealthful conditions no
longer existed. 6

82. Id.
83. Id. The Second Amended Complaint filed by the Rojas Plaintiffs alleged "causes of action for
negligent maintenance of premises, breach of the warranty of habitability .... concealment, breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment, nuisance, strict liability, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress." Id. at 101 n.2.
84. Id. at 10 1-02. The request included a demand for:
(2) "[AII actual physical evidence evidencing the condition of the buildings, including,
without limitation, photographs, videotapes, test samples, test reports (such as spore and
colony counts), and any physical evidence that was removed from the buildings and saved
(drywall, plumbing, framing members, etc.)"; (3) writings describing the buildings, including
written notes of observations made during building inspections, and witness interviews"[tlhis category would also include notes describing what the witnesses did and saw while
conducting inspections or repairs of the buildings"; (4) and (5) writings evidencing the
opinions of expert consultants, both those communicated to the defendants and those not
communicated to the defendants.
Id.
85. Id. at 102.
86. id.
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Judge McCoy, the trial court judge, held an in camera inspection of the
materials sought by the Rojas Plaintiffs. He ruled that the compilations of
materials that had been prepared for and produced at the prior mediation held in
the underlying litigation were protected by the mediation privilege set forth in
Evidence Code section 1119, and that the Rojas Plaintiffs were not entitled to
obtain them from the Coffin Defendants.8 7
The Rojas lawsuit was thereafter reassigned to Judge Mohr. 88 The Rojas
Plaintiffs filed a new motion to compel production of, among other things, (1)
photographs contained in the investigative binder and other compilations
exchanged by Coffin and the Builder Defendants at the prior mediation; (2)
videotapes, including videotapes of the project prepared by expert witnesses that
were utilized during the mediation; (3) all raw data from "bulk sampling for mold
spores"; and (4) all results from destructive testing. 89
The Rojas Plaintiffs claimed that Judge McCoy's prior ruling supported their
request for this information because it prohibited disclosure of the mediation
materials that covered only the "compilation" materials produced at the mediation,
and did not address whether the mediation privilege attached to individual
photographs or other evidence. 90 They also contended that their inability to obtain
elsewhere the raw data and photographic images constituted good cause for the
production of the requested materials, and that photographs and raw data, such as
mold spores, "did not contain attorney opinion, impression or analysis."9'
The Coffin Defendants opposed this second motion to compel "on the
grounds that the photographs and other raw evidence [were] prepared
'for ...mediation"' and, therefore, were protected from disclosure by the express
terms of Evidence Code section 1119. 9' The Coffin Defendants contended that if
they had known that the mediation privilege would not apply to this material,
they would not have produced it at the mediation, including the photographs and
other raw material. 9' Additionally, the Coffin Defendants contended that the
photographs were advocacy materials taken for the purpose of the mediation and
that they were more than just a group of photographs, but rather "constituted a
report of their experts" that revealed the experts' impressions of the construction
defects (e.g., the photographs had arrows superimposed on them showing where
the expert witness believed defects to exist). 4

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

102-03.
103.
103-04.
103.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34

Judge Mohr ruled that the materials sought by the Rojas Plaintiffs were
protected from disclosure, but expressed her own reservation that protecting this
material from disclosure makes it possible for a party to use the mediation
privilege as a means to make evidence "disappear" by simply producing the
material at a mediation.9 The Rojas Plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of
mandate by the Court of Appeal directing Judge Mohr to vacate her order and to
enter a new order compelling production of the materials sought by the Rojas
Plaintiffs .9
3. Rojas Appellate Court Proceedings
The Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ" and held that nonderivative materials such as raw test data and photographs prepared by expert
witnesses for purposes of mediation are not protected by Evidence Code section
1119. 98 The court based its reasoning on the language of Evidence Code section
1120, which it interpreted as a limitation on the scope of the mediation privilege
set forth in section 1119, designed by the Legislature to prevent evidence from
being introduced in mediation solely to preclude it from later discovery and to
place a limit on the otherwise broadly stated mediation privilege set forth in
section 11 19. 9 Based upon this interpretation, the court concluded that section
1119 does not protect "evidence," but that sections 1119 and 1120, taken
together, protect only the substance of negotiations and communications in
furtherance of the mediation, not the factual basis of the negotiations.' °°
Consequently, the court concluded, even if evidence is introduced at a mediation
(whether or not prepared by expert witnesses expressly for use at such
mediation), the mediation privilege does not necessarily protect it.'0 '
Having found that not all evidence prepared for or used at a mediation is
protected by section 1119, the court next analyzed the scope of protection that
should be afforded such evidence by applying the analytic framework used to
determine whether evidence is protected by the attorney work product doctrine."°2
Under California law, an attorney's effort, research, and thoughts in the
preparation of a case (and those of persons employed by him, such as expert
witnesses) are protected by the attorney work product doctrine to prevent others

95. Id.
96. Id. at 100.
97. Id. at 110-11.
98. Id. at 106.
99. Id. at 109. As earlier stated, section 1120 provides that "[elvidence otherwise admissible... outside
of a mediation" does not become privileged "solely by reason of its introduction ... [into] a mediation." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1120 (West 2003).
100. Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107-08.
101. Id. at 107.
102. Id. at 108-10.
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from taking undue advantage of an attorney's industry and efforts. °3 This
doctrine provides protection for an attorney's work based upon a distinction
between "derivative" and "non-derivative" materials:''o
Three levels of protection exist. Core work product, i.e., material solely
reflecting an attorney's "impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
research or theories," is entitled to absolute protection from discovery.
(Citations omitted.) Qualified protection exists for work product which is
an amalgamation of factual information and attorney thoughts,
impressions, conclusions. (Citations omitted.) Such derivative materials
would include charts and diagrams, audit reports, compilations of entries
in documents .... appraisals, opinions, and reports of experts employed
as non-testifying consultants. Derivative work product will be ordered
disclosed if denial of discovery would unfairly prejudice the other party
or result in an injustice. (Citations omitted.) The party seeking disclosure
must demonstrate good cause, which involves a balancing of the need for
disclosure against the purposes served by the work-product doctrine.
(Citations omitted.) Lastly, purely factual material receives no work
°
product protection. (Citations omitted.)'O
The court concluded "that the framework of discoverable materials under the
[attorney] work product doctrine closely mirrors the.. . statutory... exception"
to the mediation privileges contained in section 1120. Therefore, the same sort of
analytic framework should be applied to determine the scope of the mediation
privilege that is attached to evidence prepared for or used at a mediation under
section 1119.16
Accordingly, the court ruled that, to the extent that non-derivative materials
attached to a compilation that discloses an attorney's or party's "evaluations of
the strengths and weaknesses of the case or discloses" the substance of
negotiations can reasonably be detached from the compilation (such as
photographs taken by expert witnesses), it is not protected by section 1119.'n' The
court also ruled that raw test data is not protected to the extent that it can be
extrapolated from charts or reports without disclosing the attorney's or party's
evaluation or negotiation posture.108
With respect to derivative materials, the court construed Evidence Code
section 1120 to allow disclosure upon "a showing of good cause, which requires
a determination of the need for the materials balanced against the benefit to the

103.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 2018 (West 2003).

104.

Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108-09.

105.

Id.

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 110. For the express statutory exceptions set forth in section 1120, see supra note 36.
Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
Id.
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mediation privilege obtained by protecting those materials from disclosure."' 9
Reasoning that the petitioners had no other means to obtain the information
sought by them due to the facts that they were not joined in the prior litigation
and that the remediation of the construction defects eliminated physical evidence
of the defects, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial
court to conduct a careful in camera inspection of the materials sought to
determine if good cause existed for the disclosure of derivative materials."0
F. The Impact of Rojas on Calderon Act Proceedings
There is little doubt that, if affirmed, the new case-by-case balancing test
imposed by Rojas to determine the scope of the mediation privilege attached to
expert-prepared materials will seriously discourage the free exchange of such
information at Calderon mediation proceedings and encourage parties to adopt a
"wait and see" approach for purposes of "piggy-backing" off the labor and
expense of other parties. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Perluss decried the
Rojas majority's gutting of the mediation privilege: "Divining a distinction
between 'derivative' and 'non-derivative' materials nowhere found in the
statutory scheme and acknowledging only a qualified protection from disclosure
even for concededly privileged materials, the majority has now effectively
eradicated any significance from the mediation privilege in California."''.
Under Rojas, parties must now carefully consider that non-derivative
materials (raw test data, photographs, etc.) may have no mediation privilege."'
Furthermore, derivative materials may now enjoy only a qualified privilege,
subject to a balancing test that includes consideration of factors such as a party's
need for the information and whether an injustice may occur if the material is not
disclosed."3 Under Rojas, this qualified privilege attaches regardless of whether
the expert writings were prepared specifically for mediation and did not exist
independent of the mediation. 114
The Rojas balancing test imposes several dilemmas for mediation participants.
First, it is not always possible for a mediation participant to forecast an
unidentified third party's possible future need for information, or to envisage
whether information introduced at a mediation may later become unavailable.
This uncertainty makes it difficult, at best, for a mediation participant to
accurately predict whether mediation materials the mediation participant submits
might later become subject to disclosure and possibly be used against the

109.
110.
111.
112.
mediation
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 110-11.
Id.at 111.
See id. at 108-10 (discussing the applicability of the framework of the work product doctrine to the
privilege).
Id. at 110.
See id. (creating no exception for materials prepared specifically for mediation).
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mediation participant. Left to guesswork, the participant's willingness to be
candid and to exchange information freely may be substantially reduced.
Second, the Rojas court failed to establish comprehensive guideposts for its
balancing test. For instance, the Rojas decision is entirely without analysis
regarding a party's responsibility to timely secure, prepare and preserve its own
evidence." 5 As such, this consideration arguably may not be included within the
balancing test factors. On its face, the Rojas opinion accepts, without further
inquiry or discussion, the contention by the Rojas Plaintiffs that the defects had
been concealed from them." 6 The court mentioned this alleged concealment, but
did not explain its relevance, if any, with respect to the balancing test." 7 Nor did
the Rojas court explain or discuss how the Coffin Defendants allegedly
concealed the mold conditions from the Rojas Plaintiffs." 8 Presumably, testing
and inspections by the Coffin Defendants were occurring within plain view of at
least some of the Rojas Plaintiffs who remained in residence at the apartment
buildings." 9 The court's failure to address these points makes the Rojas opinion
susceptible to the interpretation that a party need only contend, not prove or offer
reliable evidence supporting the contention, that evidence of its claim was
wrongly concealed, in order to be excused from securing, preparing and
preserving its own evidence.
The Rojas court also accepts without question that the information sought by
the Rojas Plaintiffs became unavailable to them because they were not joined in
the underlying litigation between Coffin and the Builder Defendants, and
therefore, did not participate in it. 20 This dicta makes it appear that the onus was
on everyone but the Rojas Plaintiffs (who arguably sat on their rights) to ensure
that they obtained the opportunity to secure, prepare and preserve their own
evidence. It also incorrectly assumes that participation by the Rojas Plaintiffs in
the prior litigation constituted the only opportunity for them to gather and
preserve evidence. It is not clear that anything prevented the Rojas Plaintiffs
from gathering their own evidence earlier and filing a separate action against the
Coffin Defendants. Indeed, stretched to its limit, Rojas may be interpreted to
authorize production of derivative materials prepared specifically for mediation
based upon mere need or unavailability, regardless of the reasons for the party's
failure to gather and preserve its own evidence earlier.

115.

See id. at 108-10 (omitting any such analysis).

116. See id. at 101 (stating that petitioner alleged the defects had been concealed from them, but never
discussing the issue thereafter).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id. (stating that only some of the tenants vacated the building).
120. See id. at 110 (stating that, "[b]ecause petitioners were not parties to the underlying litigation and
were not joined as parties to that litigation, they do not have access to much material that has been removed or
destroyed.").
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Third, the Rojas balancing test does not insist that the mediation privilege be
pierced only upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances. 2' Unlike the Rinaker
balancing test, the Rojas balancing test does not require proof of a threatened
violation of constitutional due process rights if disclosure is prohibited."' Nor does
Rojas involve waivers of confidentiality on the part. of the mediation participants,
as did Olam."' According to Rojas, a court is entitled to order disclosure of
otherwise privileged mediation communications over the objection of parties to the
mediation upon a showing of good cause, premised on a case-by-case balancing
test that weighs a nonparticipating third party's "need" for the material against the
benefit to the mediation privilege that is obtained by consistently and predictably
protecting such materials from disclosure.' 24 In other words, a trial court would be
required to balance the prejudicial effect to a plaintiff of prohibiting disclosure of
privileged mediation materials against the chilling effect on mediation if disclosure
is ordered. Since the underlying mediation has already occurred, and any chilling
effect exists in the abstract, it is likely that the needs of the injured plaintiff will
almost always outweigh the need to protect an abstraction like mediation
confidentiality.
Finally, the Rojas decision contains no provision for compensation to the
party who is required to turn over expert materials that were prepared on its
2
behalf and at its expense for purposes of court ordered or mandatory mediation.'
Thus, an insurance company that fails to defend its insured may arguably later
obtain derivative and non-derivative materials that were prepared at the expense
of others, including its insured, for purposes of proving that no duty to defend
existed. Under Rojas, there is no apparent duty to compensate these other parties
for costs incurred in connection with developing the materials in the first
instance.
Indeed, given the importance of the mediation privilege, as recognized by the
California Supreme Court in Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, 26 it is alarming that
the Rojas court decided, based upon the facts presented in Rojas, that the
mediation privilege should be pierced by judicial construction. While the Rojas
Plaintiffs may have been a sympathetic lot, not all parties who similarly sit on
their rights are sympathetic, such as insurance companies who delay taking up
the defense of their insureds. Nevertheless, need and unavailability of information
arguably form the only guideposts for the balancing test imposed by Rojas.

121. See id. at 108-10 (discussing the analytical framework of the balancing test).
122. See id. (omitting such a requirement from the analysis).
123. See id. (omitting any discussion of waivers of confidentiality).
124. Id. at 110.
125. See id. at 108-10 (containing no requirement for compensation to the party required to disclose
mediation materials).
126. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., 125 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001); see supra Part I.D.
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In the specific context of HOA construction defect claims, the Rojas decision
contradicts and undermines several key provisions of the Calderon Act that are
specifically designed to protect parties who participate in Calderon mandatory
mediation proceedings. For instance, as earlier mentioned, California Civil Code
section 1375(l) expressly provides that "all defect lists and demands,
communications, negotiations, and settlement offers made in the course of the
prelitigation dispute resolution process.., shall be inadmissible pursuant to
Sections 1119 1to
1124, inclusive, of the Evidence Code and all applicable
27
decisional law."'
Under Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, Civil Code section 1375(l) would likely
have been construed to protect all expert-witness-prepared materials prepared for
a Calderon mediation (regardless of whether the materials were derivative or
non-derivative) because the California Supreme Court treated the mediation
privilege as sacrosanct.'28 Evidence Code section 1119 was determined to be
unambiguous and not subject to judicial construction except where potential due
process rights were threatened or where the parties waived confidentiality. 2 9 The
plain language of section 1119 provides that "[n]o writing ... that is prepared for
the purpose of. .. a mediation.., is admissible or subject to discovery .... ,,130
Under Rojas, however, Evidence Code sections 1119 and 1120 have been
judicially construed to provide no protection for non-derivative materials and
only a qualified protection for derivative materials, including defect lists and
other expert-witness-prepared communications intended to be protected from
disclosure under Civil Code section 1375.1" This judicial construction is simply
not supported by the plain language of these statutes, and is not authorized by the
Rinaker, Olam or Foxgate Homeowners' Ass 'n opinions.
Several other problematic issues arise under the Calderon Act when defect
lists and expert-witness materials prepared for mediation become subject to
disclosure to third parties. For example, section 1375.1 of the Calderon Act
specifically provides that following settlement of the construction defect claim,
the HOA Board is obligated to provide specified information to the homeowner
members regarding the settlement including: (1) a general description of the
construction defects the association believes will be repaired or replaced; (2) a
good faith estimate as to when the repairs or replacements will take place; and (3)
the status of claims for defects that are not scheduled to be repaired or replaced."'

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375(1) (West 2003).
See supra Part ll.D.
Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, 25 P.3d at 1126-28.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2003).
Rojas v. Los Angeles Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 108-10 (Ct. App. 2002).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375.1 (West 2003).
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For good reason, the Board is not required to turn over preliminary defect
lists, test data, photographs or any other expert-witness-prepared materials to the
homeowner members. Such materials are often voluminous, technical, and by
nature designed to serve an advocacy purpose-rendering them susceptible to
misinterpretation and misuse by third parties. At a Calderon mediation, an
HOA's attorney will typically present comprehensive and persuasive evidence
(including expert-witness-prepared materials) depicting the extent of every
potential construction defect. In response, the respondent typically puts on its
best evidence to minimize or challenge the HOA's claims. Both will be factbased presentations supported by expert opinion. Yet the presentations will not
be identical, and may even embellish or overly minimize a party's position for
purposes of negotiation. Importantly, the information exchanged will be, by most
standards, preliminary in nature, having been developed within a 180-day time
period, before a complaint is on file. Any settlement reached usually represents a
compromise of the two viewpoints, which is the primary motivation for HOAs to
present evidence zealously and identify all potential construction defects.
While expert-written materials are the basis for most mediation discussions,
the written information exchanged is tested and compared with written
information submitted by the opposing party, and synthesized by extensive oral
discussions among experts. As the mediation continues, expert opinions may
change on various issues, and testing results may be challenged or discounted.
However, the written materials likely are not modified to reflect the change of the
parties' or experts' positions and opinions. Thus, it is very common for an HOA
to obtain a settlement that does not include recovery for all construction defects
identified in its defect lists and expert witness compilation materials.'33 Despite
this, under Rojas, homeowner members may obtain these materials for later use
in separate litigation proceedings against the HOA, even though the evidence of
oral communications occurring at the mediation that possibly modified the
written information is inadmissible under section 1119 and Rojas.
For example, following settlement of an HOA construction defect claim, it is
not uncommon for there to be disgruntled homeowner members who feel that the
HOA is not repairing or replacing enough of the claimed defects, or who feel
they are not benefiting adequately from the settlement. If the HOA settles the
construction defect claim at the Calderon mandatory mediation without ever
having filed a complaint against the builder, the homeowner members may be
able to sue the HOA for failing to have recovered for latent defects that appear on
construction defect lists, but are not scheduled for repair or replacement.' 4 For
133. Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108-10 (discussing the balancing test utilized to determine whether
mediation materials will be subject to disclosure).
134. California Civil Code section 1365.7(f) imposes an affirmative duty on the part of HOA Boards to
decide whether it is appropriate to (1) investigate for latent defects and (2) file a civil action against the builder.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1365.7(f) (West 2003). If the HOA recovers settlement monies for only some of the claimed
defects, a homeowner may claim that the Board breached its duty to properly pursue a civil action for the
remaining defects. Id.
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purposes of pursuing this claim, Rojas would permit the disgruntled homeowner
members to obtain more than the limited information set forth in Civil Code
section 1375.1. Indeed, Rojas would permit homeowners to discover all raw test
data, photographs and other non-derivative materials, and possibly amalgamated
or derivative materials that contain the thoughts, impressions and opinions of
attorneys and expert witnesses, upon a showing that the information is not
available elsewhere or that an injustice will occur if the materials are not
disclosed. 35 As with the Rojas Plaintiffs, the homeowner members' adoption of a
"wait and see" approach should not compromise their ability to obtain this
information.
Such access to advocacy material prepared for purposes of mediation will
very likely foster further litigation within HOAs. Faced with this risk, HOAs may
elect to be less disclosive and aggressive at mediation, with the result that HOA
settlement recoveries will be reduced, or resolution without trial will become
more difficult and, perhaps, impossible. While, at first blush, reduced HOA
settlement recoveries might appeal to developers, builders and general
contractors, it is not in their interests that the mediation privilege be breached in
this manner. The strict liability imposed upon these parties for construction
defect claims makes it critical that Calderon mediation proceedings produce fair
settlement results. Otherwise, the likelihood of HOA construction defect claims
proceeding to trial will be increased, extraordinary litigation expenses will be
incurred by both sides, and the potential for runaway jury verdicts against
developers, builders and general contractors will be enhanced.
Furthermore, weaknesses of the Calderon Act are exacerbated by Rojas. The
Calderon Act involves a very ambitious 180-day schedule that contemplates, in
some cases, putting dozens of parties (including insurers) on notice of an HOA's
construction defect claim, conducting extensive invasive testing and inspections
of entire subdivisions, preparing technical expert materials, and coordinating and
completing a mediation process that often lasts from several days to several
weeks. 3 6 Among the many challenges presented by this schedule is that of
procuring the participation of parties that are essential to settlement, including all
potentially liable subcontractors, design professionals and their insurers.
Although the Calderon Act provides for certain disincentives for parties to
refuse to participate or to be dilatory about participation,'37 the Rojas decision
provides new incentives for parties, particularly subcontractors and design
professionals, and their insurers, to delay participation until after expensive
invasive testing, inspections and mediation proceedings have been completed.

135. See Rojas, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110 (discussing and implementing balancing test to determine what
mediation materials may be available for discovery).
136. See CAL. CIv. CODE§§ 1375, 1375.05, 1375.1 (West 2002).
137. See, e.g., id. § 1375(e).
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As previously mentioned, Civil Code section 1375.05(c) restricts the ability of
a party to engage in additional testing and inspections except where such party's
insurer did not receive at least thirty days notice of the testing or inspections; the
insured and separate counsel hired by the insurer did not participate in the testing
or inspections; "the insured would suffer prejudice if additional inspections or
testing are not permitted"; and the information obtainable by inspections and
testing "is not available through any reasonable alternative sources."'38 These
conditions are fairly easy
to satisfy given the ambitious 180-day schedule imposed
39
by the Calderon Act.
Civil Code section 1375.05(d) states that any subcontractor or design
professional who had notice of the mediation but failed to attend, or attended
without settlement authority, is bound by the terms of any settlement reached at a
Calderon mediation-i.e., the subcontractor or design professional cannot dispute
the good faith of the settlement reached, but may introduce evidence to support
its own position for allocation of the settlement.' 40 The ability of the nonsettling
subcontractor or design professional and its insurer to defend the insured by
asserting all available defenses in a later trial, however, is not diminished in any
way. 141
Thus, armed with the combined potential and/or actual abilities to (1) fully
defend a subcontractor or design professional later at trial under Civil Code
section 1375.05(d); (2) conduct later testing and inspections after the mediation is
concluded under Civil Code section 1375(c); (3) obtain all non-derivative expertprepared materials for mediation; and (4) obtain otherwise unavailable derivative
expert-prepared materials, the incentives for an insurer and its insured subcontractor
or design professional to participate in early mediation are vastly reduced. Indeed,
many tenders of defense by subcontractors and design professionals to their insurers
may soon become "lost" in the mail.
Additionally, if all non-derivative and derivative materials used at a Calderon
mediation proceeding are potentially subject to disclosure, an HOA must
seriously consider whether long term retention and storage of these materials is
required because of the possibility that the information might someday constitute
admissible evidence in unrelated civil proceedings. For example, HOAs and
homeowner members have certain disclosure obligations with respect to
threatening, pending and resolved construction defect claims. 42 If a purchaser
files a suit against an HOA or homeowner member claiming that the HOA and/or
138. id. § 1375.05(c).
139. Id.§ 1375(c). It is not uncommon for subcontractors and design professionals to experience
difficulties identifying and locating their insurance companies because Civil Procedure Code section 337.15
permits lawsuits for latent construction defects to be filed as many as ten years after a notice of completion for a
project has been recorded. By then, records regarding the project may have been lost or destroyed. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 2003).
140. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1375.05(d) (West 2003).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 1368(a)(6)-(7), (b).
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homeowner member failed to disclose the required information, it is likely that
the purchaser will be entitled to discover all derivative and possibly nonderivative materials (if such evidence is not available elsewhere) produced at the
earlier Calderon mediation proceedings. The result is that the HOA and all
homeowner members face increased exposure and expense under Rojas.
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, Rojas miscalculates the benefit obtained by subjecting derivative
and non-derivative written materials exchanged during mediation to disclosure
based upon the analytical framework of the attorney work product doctrine. As a
practical matter, the loss of confidentiality threatens the process of dispute
resolution as a viable alternative to litigation. According to the California Supreme
Court, Evidence Code sections 1119 and 1120 are unambiguous and should not be
subject to judicial construction except in extraordinary circumstances such as when
due process rights are threatened or where mediation participants have waived
confidentiality. 43 The Legislature has already considered the competing interests of
parties to obtain mediation communications versus the benefit to the mediation
privilege of protecting the materials against disclosure, and concluded that, except
as expressly provided by statute, the confidentiality provisions for mediation
proceedings are absolute.'44 "To carry out the purpose of encouraging mediation by
ensuring confidentiality, the statutory scheme.., unqualifiedly bars disclosure of
communications made during mediation absent an express statutory exception." 45
Beyond its analytical flaws, the Rojas decision places the effectiveness of
Calderon Act mediations in peril. The 180-day dispute resolution process
depends upon the free exchange of an immense amount of expert-prepared
materials. The protections against disclosure of these materials contained in the
Calderon Act have been compromised, thereby diminishing some of the built-in
incentives to participate and freely exchange information. Pending the Supreme
Court's review of Rojas, all Calderon mandatory mediation participants should
remain cognizant of the potential ramifications of Rojas and carefully consider
the extent and content of expert-prepared materials to be exchanged.
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Part lI.D.
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Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126-28 (Cal. 2001); see supra
Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. BramaleaCal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1119.
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